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c·ase No. 8518 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
W. C. · LAWLER and LAURA--·lt!.~~­
LA WLER, his wife, 
Defendant, and Appellants. 
v. 
WALTER H. REICHERT, 
Defendant and Oounterclaimant as 
to Earl D. Tanner, and Plaintiff 
against George Beckstead as Sheriff 
of Salt Lake County, Utah, and 
Appellant, 
v. 
GEORGE BECKSTEAD, us Sheriff of 
Salt Lake County, Utah, 
Defendant in Intervention and 
Respondent. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
and 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF. 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorney for Appellants 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EARL D. TANNER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
v. 
W. C. LAvVLER and LAURA M. 
LAWLER, his wife, 
Defendant, and Appellants. 
v. 
WALTER H. REICHERT, 
Defendant and Counterclaimant as 
to Earl D. Tanner, and Plaintiff 
against George Beckstead as Sheriff 
of Salt Lake County, Utah, and 
Appellant, 
v. 
GEORGE BECKSTEAD, as Sheriff .of 
Defendant in Intervention and 
Respondent. 
C.ase No. 8518 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
and 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH and 
ITS HONORABLE MEMBERS: 
Come now the Appellants, Walter H. Reichert, W. 
C. Lawler and Laura M. Lawler, and respectfully petition 
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this Court to grant a rehearing in the above entitled 
cause upon the following grounds: 
POINT ONE 
·THE ·COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THE APPEL-
LANTS HAVE FURNISHED A STAY BOND ON THE AP-
PEAL, AND IN STATING THAT THERE WERE LIENS ON 
SUCH PROPERTY FO·R THE DEBTS OF THE LAWLERS 
OTHER THAN THE M·ORTGAGE DEBT IN THE SUM OF 
$7373.47. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSTRUE RULE 
69(b) (1) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
AND/OR UTiAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, 104-37-30, LAWS 
OF UTAH, TO MEAN THAT A REDEMPTIONER WHO 
REDEEMS PRO·PERTY SOLD UNDER A DECREE OF FORE-
CLOSUR.E AiCQUIRES O·NLY THE INTEREST OF THE PER-
SON AGAINST WHOM SUCH REDEMPTIONER HAS A 
JUDGMENT LIEN OR MORTGAGE. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSTRUE 
U.'C.A. 1953-28-1-10. ·TO THE EFFECT THAT THE HO·ME-
STEAD EXEMPTION WAS NOT LOST BY THE MO·RTGAGE 
FO'RECLOSURE. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BECAUSE 
REICHERT PURCHASED THE ·CERTIFICATE OF SALE HE 
MAY NOT CLAIM TO BE A REDEMPTIONER FOR AND 
ON BEHALF OF THE LA WLERS. 
POIN·T FIVE 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPEL-
LANTS GAVE A STAY BOND IN ORDER TO RETAIN 
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED. 
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POINT SIX 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FACTS 
IN THIS CASE BRINGS IT WITHIN THE UNLAWFUL DE-
TAINER STATUTE OF UTAH, (U.C.A. 1953-78-36-3), AND, 
THEREFORE, LIABLE FOR THREE TIMES THE AMOUNT 
O·F RENT. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRO-
VISIONS OF U.C.A. 1953-78-36-7 APPLIES TO THE APPEL-
LANT REICHERT, AND UNDER THE FACTS IN THIS 
CASE SUCH PROVISION DOES NOT AID IN SUPPO·RTING 
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST HIM FOR DAMAGES. 
-----~----- --
Attorneys for Appellants 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE. f 
I, ELIAS HANSEN, hereby certify that I am the 
attorney for the appellants herein; th~t he believes that 
there is merit to the foregoing petition for a rehearing, 
and that grave injustice will be done to the appellants 
unles~s the errors complained of are corrected. 
Attorney for Appellants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
ARGUMENT 
In the cours-e of our agreement we shall avoid as 
far as possible a repetition of what is s.aid in our original 
briefs, but in order to present our argument in an under-
standable manner it will be necessary to touch upon 
matters which were discussed in the briefs heretofore 
filed. The question which we wish to raise by the petition 
for a Rehearing and the order in which we shall discuss 
the same is in the order stated in our petition for a 
rehearing. 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THE APPEL-
LANTS HAVE FURNISHED A STAY BOND ON APPEAL, 
AND IN STATING THAT THERE WERE LIENS ON SUCH 
PROPERTY FOR THE DEBTS OF THE LAWLERS OTHER 
THAN THE MO·RTGAGE DEBT IN 'rHE SUM OF $7373.47. 
An examination of the record ''ill, \Ye believe, show 
that the Court erred in its state1nent of the f.aets as 
above indicated. \'l e shall defer a discussion of the 
issues in the foregoing staten1ents later in this brief 
when we take up our discussion of \Yherein the appellants' 
rights would be adversely affected if the facts \vere as 
stated. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSTRUE RULE 
69(f) (1) OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND/OR 
UTAH CO·DE ANNOTATED, 1943-104-37-30, TO MEAN THAT 
A REDEMPTIO·NER WHO REDEEMS PROPERTY SOLD 
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UNDER A DEGREE OF FORECLOSURE ACQUIRES ONLY 
THE INTEREST OF THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM SUCH 
REDEMPTIONER HAS A JUDGMENT LIEN OR MORT-
GAGE. 
In our original brief we discussed this phase of the 
case .at considerable length, and cited a number of author-
ities and adjudicated cases dealing with the effect of 
a redemption by a person who has a lien or judgment 
against only one of the owners vv-hose property has been 
sold to satisfy a mortgage or judgment upon which 
two or more persons are liable. The Court, ho,vever, 
does not discuss, and so f.ar as a ppear.s from the opinion 
heretofore written, does not decide that question. We say, 
does not decide that question because if, as the Court 
stated in its opinion, the liens against the property here 
involved were obligations of the Lavvler.s, said question 
would not be necessary for a decision. If the judgment 
of Clowes which was assigned to the plaintiff had 
been against both Mr. and Mrs. Lawler, then and in 
such case, of course, there would he no taking of Mrs. 
Lawler's property to pay the debt of Mr. Lawler. Of 
course, the fact that the Lawlers were husband and wife 
would not change the law because in Utah a vvife is 
not liable for her husband's debts. U.C.A. 1953-30-2-1. 
Indeed a wife has an inchoate right in her husband's 
real property which may not be! taken from her unless 
she has made a relinquishment thereof. U.~C'.A. 1953-
74-4-3. 
It is a matter of common knowledge among attorneys, 
especially in recent years, that most property acquired 
by a husband and wife the title is taken in their joint 
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name.s. So also is it quite common for title to real 
propHrty to be taken in the names of two or more persons. 
We direet the attention of the Court to these matters 
because it is of vital importance to persons who take 
title to real estate with other to know what might happen 
to their interest if a mortgage thereon may be fore-
closed, or if one of the co-tenants should suffer a judg-
ment to be rendered .against him, and his interest in the 
property levied upon to pay the judgment. 
In light of the.se facts we again direct the attention 
of the c·ourt to the authorities with a state of facts 
similar to the facts in this case. On pages 8 to 15 of 
our Reply Brief filed herein we have discussed this 
phase of the case. We adopt what is there said in sup-
port of appellants' Petition for a Rehearing. It will be 
seen from the authorities cited on page 12 of the Reply 
Brief the Supreme Court of lllinois and New York 
take the view that one who has an interest as a tenant 
in common of real estate may not be deprived of such 
interest where the prope-rty is sold to pay the debt of 
another indebted tenant in common, and thereafter a 
redemption had by one "\Yho has a lien on the interest 
of one cotenant cannot by such reden1ption deprive the 
other cotenant of his interest in the property. \V e also 
there cite Vol. 3 of the 3rd Edit ion, pages 1884, Section 
321, of Freeman on Executions. "\Yhere, in commenting 
on the decision of a California court in the ca.se of 
Eldredge v. Wright, 55 Cal. 531, he said: 
"The absurdity of the proposition therein 
announced is made manifest in that the redemp-
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tion in such a case has no lien against the prop-
erty of but one co-tenant and therefore no right 
to make the property of the other answerable for 
his debt." 
In this ca.se there can be no escape from the conclusion 
that if the plaintiff may retain the property here in-
volved, it will be a taking of the property of Mrs. Lawler 
to pay a debt of Mr. Lawler. The fact that such result 
is accomplished indirectly should make no difference 
because it is, of course, a uniform principle of law that 
a result may not be accomplished indirectly that may 
not be accomplished directly. 
In none of the cases which have come to our atten-
tion has the constitutionality been raised of a statute 
which thus authorizes the property of one person to be 
used to pay the debts of another. The fact that an author 
of the standing of Mr. Freeman has char.acterized the 
results reached in the California case as being absurd 
would seem to indicate that in his opinion a law so con-
strued as to bring about such results is unconstitutional. 
In our original brief we did not cite any authorities 
de.aling with the bases for declaring laws unconstitu-
tional. We hesitated to do so because the general princi-
ples which serve to determine when legislation and other 
acts are constitutional and when unconstitutional are 
so well established that we felt it would be indiscreet 
to direct the attention of the Court to such principles 
\Vhere the facts are so clear as they .are in this case. 
However, in light of the fact that the Court did not 
discuss the question of the constitutionality of an act 
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which may he construed so that the prop·erty of one 
p-erson may be taken to pay the debt of another, we may 
be pardoned if we direct the attention of the Court to 
such principles. 
We quote the following from Colley's Constitutional 
Limitation, Vol. 2, page 736: 
"Perhaps no definition is more often quoted 
than that given by Mr. vV ebster in the Dartmouth 
College ease: 'By the law of the land' is most 
clearly intended the general law, a law which 
hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon 
inquiry and renders judgment after trial. The 
meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life, 
liberty, property and immunitie:s, under the pro-
tection of the general rules which govern society. 
Everything which may pass under the form of 
an enactment is not therefore to be construed the 
law of the land. The definition here given is apt 
and suitable as applied to judicial proceedings 
which cannot be valid unless they proceed upon 
inquiry and render judg1nent only after trial. It 
is entirely correct, also in .assuming that a legis-
lative enactment is not necessarily the law of 
the land. The words 'by the law of the land' as 
us·ed in the ·Constitution do not mean a statute 
passed for the purpose of 'Yorking the wrong. 
That construction 'v-ould render the restrictions 
absolutely negatory, and render this part of the 
Constitution into mere nonsense." 
The la"r .above uotPd is of such general and uniforn1 
application that this Court 'vould probably resent a cita-
tion of thP nun1erous sta tt~ and federal eases ":here such 
doctrine is announeed. ''r e shall not be guilty of such 
i1npropriety, but fihall be content to aga1n direct the 
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attention of the Court to the fact that so f.ar as Mrs. 
Lawler is concerned, she has never had her day in court 
insofar as the judgment asserted by the plaintiff shall 
be satisfied out of her interest in the property here in-
volved. She was not given notice that Paul Cowles 
claimed a lien on Mrs. Lawler's interest in the property, 
.and if she had been so informed, such information could 
not result in taking her property to pay the debt of Mr. 
Lawler. No trial was ever had as to the claim of a lien 
by Cowles, the assignor of the plaintiff on the property 
of Mrs. Lawler. 
We again call this rna tter to the attention of the 
Court not only because of its importance in this case, 
but so that it may become known whether or not one 
who is the ovvner of a tract of land as a joint tenant 
or tenant in common which is subject to a mortgage may, 
upon the foreclosure thereof, have all his interest in 
the property subject not only to pay the mortgage debt, 
but also the debts of his cotenant which have been re-
duced to a judgment. In our original Reply Brief we 
have directed the attention of the Court to the cases 
of Fischer v. Eslaman, 68 Ill. 78; Neilson v. Neilson, 
5 Barb. 565, and Erwin v. Schefner, 19 John. 379. We 
also again direct the attention of the Court to the state-
ment of Freeman on Executions, 3rd Ed. page 1884, 
Sec. 321, where it is said that: 
"The absurdity of this proposition that a re-
demption by a person holding a judgment against 
one tenant in common may carry with it the rights 
of a co-tenant against whom the. redemptioner 
seems manifest from the results reached, namely, 
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that the p:roperty of the co-tenant is taken to pay 
a debt which is not owing by him but by his co-
tenant." 
In connection with this phase of the case we also 
direct the attention of the Court to the well established 
rule of law that one cannot do indirectly that which he 
may not do directly. As applied to the facts in this case, 
if Cowles or the plaintiff may not in a direct proceeding 
against the Lawlers acquire the rights of Mr.s. Lawler 
in the prop·erty here involved, he may not acquire such 
right by the process of redeeming the property from 
the mortgage foreclosure proceedings. There is, of course, 
this further well est~blished rule of law, namely, that 
the courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of 
a law unless the same is raised. So far as we are able 
to as·certain that question has never been passed upon. 
If, however, the learned author of Freeman on Execution 
heretofore mentioned correctly concluded that the Cali-
fornia rule announeed in the case of Eldredge v. Wright_, 
55 Cal. 531, is absurd, it would seem to necessarily 
follow that a law which permits such results is of neces-
·Sity unconstitutional, that is, if a la'v is absurd because 
it justifies the taking of the property of one co-tenant 
to pay the debts of another co-tenant, it necessarily 
follows that an ,alleged la"'" or rule of court, that brings 
about such results, is unconstitutional. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING T.O CONSTRUE 
U.C.A. 1953--28-1-10. TO THE EFFECT THAT THE HOME-
STEAD EXEMPTION WAS NOT LOST BY THE MO·RTGAGE 
FO'RECLOSURE. 
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In our original brief appellants have discussed the 
matter of the homestead rights of the Lawler:s, and 
the fact that Reichert acquired such rights when the 
Lawlers conveyed the property to him by a Quitclaim 
Deed. In the opinion heretofore written the Court did 
not diseuss or expressly pass upon that phase of the 
case. Because of the importance of the matter of a home-
stead right not only as to the parties to this proceding, 
but as to others who might find themselves confronted 
with a situation such as is here presented, we wish to 
ag.ain call this matter to the attention of the Court. 
We can concieve of no ground upon which it may be 
said that the Lawlers lost their h-omestead rights unless 
it be because of the provisions of U.C.A. 1953-28-1-10. We 
again direct the attention of the Court to the fact that 
the Lawlers had no occasion to claim their homestead 
rights in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings, .and 
that prior to the time the plaintiff sought to redeem the 
property the Lawlers asserted their homestead rights 
by Mr. Lavvler serving on the Sheriff and recording a 
designation of a homestead as by law provided. It will 
be seen that the provisions of U.C.A. 1953-28-1-10 are 
made expressly applicable only to the purchaser at the 
sale. The Act provides that if the homestead claim is 
not filed or served "as herein provided, title shall pass 
to the purchaser at such sale free and clear of all home-
stead rights." To construe the act to include redemp-
tioners who redeem the property after those entitled 
to .a homestead have filed and recorded the homestead, 
have fully complied with the Act, is to enlarge the Ian-
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12 
guage of the act far beyond its natural meaning. A re-
demptioner 'vith knowledge of the fact that mortgagors 
were claiming a homestead, and the fact that tltey had 
complied with the law even if belatedly, may not be 
heard to say that he was mislead. Such redemptioner 
must prevail if at all on a construction of the Act to 
the effect that the mortgagors have for all time been 
foreclosed from claiming a homestead exemption in the 
property foreclosed. 
After the foreclosure proceedings were had the 
Lawlers retained the right to retain possession of the 
property and to redeem the same within the six month 
p·eriod. 
This Court has held in the case of Panagopulos v. 
Manning, et ux., _____ 1~~----- Utah __ j_t_r_ ____ , 69 Pac. ( 2d) 
614, that the homestead right is founded on public policy; 
that the homestead right unde·r the .statute and Constitu-
tion is an absolute right 'vhich neither the Legislature 
nor courts can infringe, and exemption statute must be 
construed to give effect to the objects 'vhich the fra1ners 
of the Constitution and Legislature had in mind to secure 
shelter and support to the fa1nily; that a homestead 
right may be predicated upon title and upon possession, 
and homestead exen1ption n1ay be asserted to protect 
either one. If U.C.A. 1953-:~S-1-10 is to be construed to 
mean that a homestead right is forever gone unless the 
owner thereof con1plies 'vith its provisions before a sale 
under a mortgage foreclosure proceeding is had, then 
indeed doe.s such right rest upon a flin1sy foundation 
and contrary to the expressed vie,vs of this Court in 
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13 
the case of Panagopulos v. Manning, et ux, is not entitled 
to "he bro.adly construed to accomplish its beneficial 
purpose." 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BECAUSE 
REICHERT PURCHASED THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE HE 
MAY NOT CLAIM TO BE A REDEMPTIONER FOR AND 
ON BEHALF OF THE LAWLERS. 
In the course of the opinion this Court said: 
"Since Reichert, deliberately and on advice of 
counsel with knowledge that Tanner was inter-
ested in redeeming this property, chose to take 
an assignment from the Assurance Con1pany in-
stead of a Certificate of Redemption, he is now 
barred by that choice. So it is necessary for us to 
determine what w.as the effect of that assignment 
or the further rights to redeem this property 
from that Sheriff's sale. An assignment merely 
sets over or transfers the interest of one party 
in certain property to another. Such an assign-
ment does not have the effect of canceling any 
rights which other persons have in connection 
with such property." 
We do not, if we could, contend that Reichert is not 
bound by what he did. However, the only right, at most, 
that Tanner had in the property was a lien on the interest 
of :11:r. Lawler and the right to redeem the property 
only if Lawler, or his assignee, failed to pay the amount 
owing to the mortgagee, Pacific National Life. 
The definition that is given by the Court to an 
assignment would seem to be equally applicable to ,a 
redemption. We quote the following definition of re-
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demption from 76 C.J.S. 177, where numerous cases are 
cited wherein redemption is defined. In the law of mort~ 
gage redemption is thus defined: 
"Redemption as the term is us.ed in the law 
o.f mortgages may be defined as a transaction 
through which the mortgagor, or one claiming jn 
his right, by means of a payment or the perform-
ance of a condition re-acquires or buys back the 
title which may have passed under the mortgage 
or ·divests the mortgaged premises of the lien 
which the mortgage may have created." 
Here again are numerous cases cited in support of 
the text. To discuss the same would extend this brief 
beyond reasonable limit.s. We quote the following from 
the case of Layton v. Thayne, 144 Fed. (2d) 94. 
"To redeem is to purchase back by paying 
the obligation. Bouvier's Law Diet. Rawle's Third 
Revision, Vol. 2, page 2852." 
The foregoing case is from Utah and the Tenth Circuit 
Court. 
The definition there given is typical of the defini-
tion given in the other cases. It would serve no useful 
purpose to review the cases because of the results flo"\\~ng 
from an assignment of .a Certificate of Sale are the 
same as those flo,ving fron1 the usual procedure followed 
from a redemption, it would seem to be immaterial 'vhich 
method is followed. In other words, as the courts upon 
nurnerous occasions have said, it is substance not form 
that is of controlling importance. 
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There would seem to be no doubt but that if a re-
demption had been made by the L.awlers, the effect of 
the sale under foreclosure would have terminated. It 
is provided in Rule 69(f) (5) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure that: 
"If the judgment debtor redeems, he must 
make the same payments as are required to effect 
a redemption by a creditor. If the del)tor redeems, 
the effect of the sale is terminated and he is 
restored to his former estate." 
Thus, if and when the L.awlers redeemed from the mort-
gagee, they became vested with the title to the property. 
The property thus redeemed would be subject to the 
judgment liens the same as before the mortgage fore-
closure proceedings were had. Assume, however, Mr. 
Lawler instead of Reichert had gone to the mortgagee 
Insurance Company and had asked and received an 
assignment of the Certificate of Sale, can there be any 
doubt but that the effect of the sale would have termin-
ated and the Lawlers would have been restored to their 
former estate~ Of course, in such case such liens as. 
existed against the property of Mr. Lawler would con-
tinue to exist the same as if typical redemption had 
been made. It would seem clear that if and when the 
mortgagors pay to the mortgagee, who holds a Certifi-
cate of Sale, the same payments as are required to 
effect a redemption by a creditor, the effect of the sale 
is terminated and the mortgagors are restored to their 
former estate. C.an it be said that the legislature intended 
that, if a mortgagor chooses to go to the mortgagee and 
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pays the amount owing and receive·d from such mort-
gagee an assignment of the Certificate of Sale instead 
of some other papers, that thereby the mortgagor is 
not restored to his former estate~ The important act, 
the act that has substance, is paying the mortgagee what 
is owing to him. Until a creditor has paid something 
toward the redemption of the property he has no interest 
therein. It is only if and when the mortgagor fails to 
act that the creditor may redeem. A lien of a creditor 
is not effected by the foreclosure of the mortgage except 
in relation to the rights of the mortgagee whose mort-
gage has been foreclosed. If the mortgagor pays off 
the mortgage and such payment is made evident either 
by an assignment of the Certificate of Sale, or by .a 
conventional redemption, the lien of a judg1nent or mort-
gage held by a creditor is not adversely effected. Indeed, ../. 
if the Lawlers had paid out of their own pockets the 
money necessary to pay off the mortgage debt, the 
various persons who had a lien on the p-roperty of the 
L.awlers would have become more valuable in that their 
liens would not be .subject to the superior lien of the 
mortgage. Be that as it 1nay, the point we wish to enlpha-
size is that the method by ·w·hich the rights of the mort-
gagee under the Certificate of Sale p-assed to the nlort-
gagors could not adversely effect those 'vho may have 
had a lien on the property. The effect of the sale 'vas 
terminated when the n1ortgagors n1ade their peace "\vith 
the 1nortgagee, who held the Certificate of Sale. It should 
further be observed that there is nothing in the la"\v or 
rules of court vvhich prohibit or tend to prohibit or 
penalize one who adopt.s a proceding such as "\vas here 
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followed to secure the interest of the mortgagee. The 
authorities generally teach that where a certain result 
is to be accomplished .and a method for its accomplish-
ment is designated that does not preclude nor render less 
effective some other method calculated to accomplish 
the same result. 
The thought is thus expressed in the famous case of 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 L. Ed. 579, 
where Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, writing the opinion 
said: 
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within 
the scope of the Constitution and .all means which 
are appropriate which are plainly adapted to that 
end, which are not prohibited but consistent with 
the letter and spirit of the Constitution are con-
stitutional. Obviously if there is a doctrine which 
properly save an act from being unconstitutional, 
by the same token such doctrine will save an act 
not expressly prohibited from being impossible 
to follow to accomplish the desired result." 
\liewing the facts here involved from the part that 
1f.r. Reichert took in this proceeding at the outset, it 
may be observed that if l\ir. Reichert had merely re-
deemed the property in the names of the Lawlers, such 
a transaction would doubtless made Mr. Reichert a 
mere creditor of the Lawlers for the amount of money 
advanced for that purpose. 
It will be seen from the stipulation of the facts 
and the Exhibits that W. C. Lawler executed a Declara-
tion of Homestead; that both of the Lawlers executed 
a Quitclaim Deed and delivered it to Reichert, and that 
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the Pacific National executed and delivered to Reichert 
an assignment of the Certificate of Sale. The Sheriff 
was notified of these facts, and the instruments were 
all placed of record before plaintiff sought to redeem 
the property (R. 60-61). When such Certificate of Sale 
was acquired by Reichert, the Lawlers, or their successors 
in title, had the first right to redeem the property. Had 
they done so the effeet of the sale would have terminated 
and the Lawlers, or their successors in interest, would 
have been restored to their estate. It is so provided by 
Rtttle 69(f) (5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It 
is apparent that the Lawlers did not have the money 
with which to redeem, and therefore they conveyed the 
property to Reichert. 
Upon the Lawlers conveying the property to Reichert 
he, as the successor in interest of the Lawlers, had the 
first right to redeem the property. Thus after Reichert 
had acquired the title to the property and the Certificate 
of Sale, he, as the Grantee of the Lawlers and the As-
signee of the Pacific National, had a clear right as the 
Grantee of the Lawlers to redeem from himself as the 
Assignee of the Pacific National the property here in-
volved. It is not easy to see just ho"T that could be ac-
complished, but if it had been done there would be no 
escape from the conclusion that "the effect of the sale 
would be terminated and Reicherts, as the successor in 
interest of the LRw1ers, '""ould be restored to their estate." 
And, also, if Reichert had gone through such purpose-
less proceeding the plaintiff would have no standing in 
court, and the appellants could not be charged 'vith 
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rental or damages, much less treble damages. It is said 
that the appellants knew that the plaintiff was interested 
in redeeming the premises. The .appellant.s, however, 
were not required to stand by and see if plaintiff's 
interest materialized. Doubtless the plaintiff also knew 
that the appellants were interested in redeeming the 
property, and plaintiff knew that the appellants had 
p.aid off the money owing the mortgagee before he, 
plaintiff, parted with any money, and he also must have 
known that any judgment lien that he had against the 
property was not destroyed or deteriorated by what had 
been done by the appellants. 
POINT FIVE 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPEL-
LANTS GAVE A STAY BOND IN ORDER TO RETAIN 
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED. 
It will he seen from records on file herein that .a 
Supersedeas Bond was filed by Reichert for the sole 
purpose of staying execution on the money judgment 
that was rendered against Reichert. The bond was 
brought up at the request of Reichert, and will be found 
at pages 96 and 97 of the Record. It will be seen that 
such bond expressly provides that a judgment of $500.00 
was rendered ag.ainst Reichert, and that he de.sires to 
appeal therefrom. There is not even a suggestion in 
the stay bond that Reichert sought a stay of the judg-
ment insofar as the possession of the property was 
concerned. So far as the Lawlers were concerned, no 
stay or supersedeas bond was filed. There was .a cost 
bond filed by all of the appellants, which bond is also 
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made a part of the Record filed in this cause (R. 98). 
That bond is in the amount fixed by the Rules of Court. 
The appellants having failed and refused to file a stav 
o/ 
or supersedeas bond to stay the proceedings as to the 
possession of the property, the plaintiff was at liberty 
to take such steps as he deemed necessary to get posses-
sion of the property. He may not refuse and neglect 
to exercise such right for the purpose of collecting rent, 
especially three times the amount of the rental v.alue 
of the property. Rule 62 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
POINT SIX 
THE ~COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FACTS 
IN THIS CASE BRINGS IT WITHIN THE UNLAWFUL DE-
TAINER STATUTE OF UTAH, U.C.A. 1953-78-36-3, AND IN 
HO·LDING THAT APPELLANTS ARE LIABLE FOR THREE 
TIMES THE AMOUNT O·F REASONABLE RENTAL VALUE 
OF THE PROPERTY. 
The unlawful detainer statute of Utah is taken from 
California. This Court has so held. Buchanan v. Crites, 
106 Utah 428; 150 Pac. (2d) 100, 103. 
In 1865 in the case of Reay v. Cotter, 29 Cal, 169, 
the Supreme Court of California construed a statute 
later adopted in Utah. ''T e quote at son1e length from 
that opinion because the law there eonstrued is the 
same as our law dealing with unlawful detainer. frhe 
opinion in that case very rlearly construes that law·, 
and the courts have frequently cited the construction 
so given. From our research the courts haYe uniformly 
approved and followed the construction there given 
whenever called upon to construe a la'v comparable to 
the California l~aw. It is there held: 
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"If a landlord sells the leased property and 
assigns to the purchaser the lease, and the tenant 
does not attorn to the purchaser or recognize him 
as landlord, the purchaser cannot recover posses-
sion of the premises from the tenant under the 
act concerning forcible entries and unlawful de-
tainer; that the act was designed to afford .a 
summary remedy for the recovery of land as 
against a conventional tenant who holds over con-
trary to the terms of the lease there by releasing 
the landlord fr:om the nece.ssity of resorting to 
the more costly and dilatory remedy .afforded by 
the action of ejectment. It was not intended to 
apply to any case where the title to the land 
could be made a question, but only to cases where 
from the nature of the relation between the 
parties no such question could be made because 
prohibited by law. Where the conventional rela-
tion of landlord and tenant exists the law does 
not permit the latter to dispute the title of the 
former. He is estopped by his lease. Hence in 
such a case the landlord is not required to make 
proof of his title, but he may rest upon the lease 
and proof of compliance on his part. In such a 
case title is not and cannot be made a question. 
Where however the conventional relation of land-
lord and tenant does not exist the latter is not 
so estopped, there being no privity between him 
and the plaintiff and he may deny the title of the 
latter and put him upon proof of his reversionary 
estate." 
We have examined numerous cases where the acts 
dealing with the question of forcible entry and detainer 
and unlawful detainer has been involved. From such 
examination we have found no case where an act com-
parable with the California law and our law touching 
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unlawful detainer has been construed contrary to the 
construction given in the case of Reay v. Cotter, supra, 
and a great number of cases where the construction 
given in that case has been adopted and followed. We 
refer the Court to the following cases where other cases 
of similar import are cited with approval and followed: 
Jones v. White, 230 Ala. 144; 160 So. 239. 
Denton v. Denton, et al., 190 S.W. (2d) 291. (Ark.) 
Johnson v. Hampton, 266 S.W. 561. (Tex.) 
Barber v. Todd, et al., 128 S.W. (2d) 290. (Mo.) 
Hails Execs. v. Robinson, 191 Ky. 631; 165 S.W. 
(2d) 163. 
Hansen v. Fitzee, 197 N.W. 170; 183 Wi~. 25. 
Doy.le v. Mullany, et al., 89 Mont. 201,295 Pac. 760. 
White v. Veitch, 27 Wyo. 401, 197 Pac. 983. 
Yori v. Phenix, 38 Nev. 277; 149 Pac. 180. 
Sanders v. Thornton, 97 Fed. 863. 
Dunne v. School Trttstees, 39 ill. 578. 
Woodman v. Ranger, 30 Me. 180. 
Twiss v. Boehmer, 39 Ore. 359, 65 Pac. 18. 
That in effect is the view expressed by this Court 
in Dunbar, et al., v. Hanswn, 68 Utah 398, 260 Pac. 982, 
and Williams v. Nelson, 65 Utah 304, 307, 237 Pac. 217. 
None of the cases cited in the opinion of the court in 
this case are to the contrary. 
It would also seem that by the doctrine of Christen-
sen v. Hansen, 107 Utah 234-, 152 Pac. (2d) 95-±, the 
Court could not proceed to try this case as one on unlaw·-
ful detainer. 
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Not only is there a total absence of any evidence 
showing or tending to show that the Lawlers were ever 
tenants of the plaintiff, but the stipulation shows the 
contrary. Thus it is stipulated that the Lawlers were 
and had been in possession of the property quite some 
time before the mortgage was foreclosed, but that "Since 
December 29, 1955, the intervenor has had posses.sion of 
the above described premises by and through the defend-
ants, W. C. Lawler and Laura M. Lawler, who claimed 
and still claim to be the tenants of the intervenor, and 
the intervenor refused .and refuses to surrender the 
possession of said premises to the plaintiff." (R. 62) As 
we pointed out in our original brief, there is nothing 
which shows or tends to show that Reichert could sur-
render the possession to the plaintiff. The only reason-
able inference to be drawn from the stipulation is that 
Reicherts, having agreed to permit the Lawlers to re-
main in possession, could not remove them from posses-
sion. The point we wish to direct to the attention of the 
Court upon this Petition for a rehearing is that if the 
Lawlers were the tenants of Reichert, they could not 
be the tenants of the plaintiff, so that the plaintiff could 
prosecute an action for unlawful detainer. Needless to 
say, that unless plaintiff brings himself within the class 
of a landlord pur.suant to the unlawful detainer statute, 
he cannot recover treble damages. All of the cases we 
have examined so hold. So also must the judgment for 
$500.00 fail because the same is 3 times the rental up 
to the date of the judgment. 
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In this connection it will also be noted from a 
reading of the cases above ·cited touching on actions in 
unlawful detainer, that if the plaintiff does not bring 
himself within the statute of unlawful detainer, he must 
completely f.ail in the action, and may not recover on 
some other theory. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE ·COURT ERRED IN H·OLDING THAT THE PRO-
VISIONS OF U.C.A. 1953-78-36-7 APPLIES TO THE APPEL-
LANT REICHERT, AND UNDER 'THE FACTS IN THIS 
CASE SU·CH PROVISION DO·ES NOT AID IN SUPPO·RTING 
THE JUDGMEN·T AGAINST HIM FOR DAMAGES. 
It will be seen that U.C.A. 1953-78-36-7 is a part of 
the statute dealing with unlawful detainer. That being 
so, what we have said under Point Six is ap,plicable to 
this Point Seven. The relation of landlord and tenant 
does not and is not claimed to exist between the plaintiff 
and either of the appellants, and, therefore, an act 
dealing with th·at relationship has no bearing on some 
other relationship. 
Appellants pray that a rehearing be granted, that 
the errors complained of be corrected, and that a judg-
ment be made in conformity with the prayer of the 
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